Signaling and employer learning with instruments

Natura: Monografia - Materiale testuale - Risorsa elettronica
Descrizione: Signaling and employer learning with instruments / Gaurab Aryal, Manudeep Bhuller, Fabian Lange. - Dati testuali elettronici. - Bonn : IZA, 2020. - (IZA Discussion paper ; 12953)
Sommario/Abstract: The social and the private returns to education differ when education can increase productivity, and also be used to signal productivity. We show how instrumental variables can be used to separately identify and estimate the social and private returns to education within the employer learning framework of Farber and Gibbons [1996] and Altonji and Pierret [2001]. What an instrumental variable identifies depends crucially on whether the instrument is hidden from, or observed by, the employers. If the instrument is hidden then it identifies the private returns to education, but if the instrument is observed by employers then it identifies the social returns to education. Interestingly, however, among experienced workers the instrument identifies the social returns to education, regardless of whether or not it is hidden.
Collezione: [Fa parte di] IZA Discussion paper ; 12953 [Vai al dettaglio]
Autore:
Aryal, Gaurab
Bhuller, Manudeep
Lange, Peter
Termine di thesauro:
Capitale umano
Istruzione
Classificazione:
[Classificazione Decimale Dewey] 331.2592 - Economia del lavoro. Formazione
Chiavi:
Formazione
Paese pubblicazione: Germania
Lingua: Inglese
ID scheda: 22500
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